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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-1159 
_______________ 
 
JAMIE WILLIAMS, Individually and as Administratrix 
ad Prosequendum of Estate of Peter Lee Williams,  
deceased; MAUREEN WILLIAMS, 
Appellants 
 
 v. 
 
 GEORGE PONIK; BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
CITY OF BAYONNE; JOHYN DOE POLICE OFFICERS 1-10; 
JOHN DOE 1-10, individually and/or in their official capacities, 
jointly, severally and/or in the alternative 
RALPH SCIANNI, Bayonne Police Department 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-01050) 
District Judge: Hon. John M. Vazquez  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 21, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: August 24, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants Jamie Williams and Maureen Williams appeal the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Appellees City of Bayonne (the “City”), Bayonne Police 
Department (the “BPD”), George Ponik (“Officer Ponik”), and Chief of Police Ralph 
Scianni (“Chief Scianni,” and collectively, “Appellees”) on their claim for excessive 
force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the “NJCRA”) 
following the death of Peter Lee Williams (“Peter Williams”).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. 
I.   
In June 2014, Officer Ponik from the BPD responded to an incident at an 
apartment building in Bayonne, New Jersey.  Upon arrival, he observed an altercation 
involving 20-30 people, approximately 12 of whom were fighting inside an apartment 
vestibule, including Peter Williams and his daughter Maureen Williams.  Officer Ponik 
testified that he entered the vestibule and shouted “Stop it.  Stop it.  Everybody stop.”1  
Seconds later, he deployed pepper spray into the air.  The altercation stopped, and the 
individuals exited.  
After exiting the vestibule, Peter Williams collapsed.  Officer Ponik and other 
officers attended to him until an ambulance arrived.  Sadly, Peter Williams passed away 
at the hospital.  The final autopsy report stated that the manner of death was “natural,” 
 
1 App. 100.   
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and the cause of death was severe coronary disease with contributory causes of cocaine 
use and mild obesity.2  
Appellants filed a thirteen-count Complaint in the District Court, alleging that 
Officer Ponik’s actions violated their rights under federal and state law.  Appellants later 
filed an Amended Complaint, substituting Chief Scianni as the correct BPD Chief of 
Police at the time of the incident and dismissed their third and sixth causes of action.   
Following discovery, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted the motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice, 
finding, inter alia, that (i) no genuine issue of material of fact existed as to the 
reasonableness of Officer Ponik’s use of force; (ii) there was no Monell3 liability as to the 
City and Chief Scianni for failure to train BPD officers on pepper spray; (iii) Appellants 
failed to present authority to support their assertion that Officer Ponik falsely imprisoned 
Peter and Maureen Williams; and (iv) because no constitutional violation occurred, 
Appellees were shielded from liability for the state law tort claims.4  This timely appeal 
followed.  
 
2 App. 278 (capitalization altered).  
3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
4 As part of its ruling, the District Court dismissed with prejudice the § 1983 claims and 
New Jersey state law claims as to the BPD, finding that it is an administrative arm of the 
City.  App. 11-12; 21; see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department as a single 
entity for purposes of section 1983 liability.”).  Appellants do not dispute the dismissals 
as to the BPD.   
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II.  
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s decision granting 
summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the District Court.5  
Summary judgment is only appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6  Genuine issues of material 
fact exist if, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party.7   
III.  
Appellants raise a number of arguments on appeal, including that (i) Officer 
Ponik’s use of pepper spray was excessive force; (ii) the City is liable under Monell for 
failure to train its officers; (iii) Officer Ponik falsely imprisoned Peter and Maureen 
Williams; and (iv) Appellees committed various state law torts.  Upon its finding that 
Officer Ponik’s use of force was objectively reasonable, the District Court dismissed the 
remainder of Appellants’ claims.  We will discuss each issue in turn.   
 
5 Halsey v. Pfeifer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). 
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
7 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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A.  
 Appellants first argue that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Ponik’s 
deployment of pepper spray constituted excessive force under federal and state law.8  We 
agree. 
 To make out a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, “a plaintiff 
must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”9  In evaluating an excessive force claim, we must determine the 
objective reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.10  The proper calculation of 
reasonableness “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”11  We have held that the issue of 
reasonableness is ordinarily one for the jury.12 
 
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2.  The language of the NJCRA and § 1983 
are comparable, and neither party argues that the state analogue requires a different 
analysis.  See Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 94 A.3d 869, 875 (N.J. 2014) (noting that the 
NJCRA was intended to be analogous to § 1983).   
9 Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2011).  
10 Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006).  
11 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 
810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (providing additional factors, including “the possibility that the 
persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of 
the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the 
possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the 
police officers must contend at one time”). 
12 See Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Abraham v. 
Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
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 Construing all facts and inferences for the nonmoving party, a reasonable jury 
could find that any of the objective reasonableness factors weigh in Appellants’ favor.  
As to the severity of the crime, Officer Ponik observed approximately a dozen people 
fighting inside the small vestibule of an apartment building.  It is undisputed that 
Maureen Williams was involved in the fight, but Peter Williams was trying to break up 
the fight and was not acting aggressively.  Maureen and Peter Williams were never 
arrested, and indeed, no other arrests were made.  As to the imminent threat factor, while 
Officer Ponik testified at his deposition that he had a generic, non-specific “fear of my 
safety and for everybody else,” a reasonable jury could still find that he was not in 
imminent harm.13  To that end, Officer Ponik testified that he was only “slightly pushed,” 
and that was “just because the crowd was moving.”14  It is undisputed that Peter Williams 
did not possess a weapon.  Indeed, Officer Ponik admitted that he did not see any 
weapons upon entering the vestibule, and no weapons were ever found.  Finally, Officer 
Ponik admitted that no one was hostile, aggressive or resisting arrest.15  
In the alternative, Appellees assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity.  
But a decision on qualified immunity would be premature because “there are unresolved 
 
13 App. 100.  
14 App. 106.   
15 See Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419-20 (3d Cir. 2015) (vacating summary 
judgment order even where appellant admitted resisting arrest before being pepper 
sprayed because the severity of the crime and imminent harm factors weighed in his 
favor, and his resistance was not violent).  
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disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”16  For these reasons, 
material factual disputes exist as to whether Officer Ponik used excessive force.  The 
existence of those disputes compels us to find that the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment was inappropriate, as was the dismissal of Appellants’ contingent state law tort 
claims. 
B.  
  Appellants next argue that the City and Chief Scianni are liable under Monell for (i) 
developing and maintaining policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to 
constitutional rights, or (ii) failing to train police officers in the use of pepper spray 
following citizen complaints.  We disagree. 
 To find a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the existence of 
a policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional violation.17  Liability “must be 
founded upon evidence that the government unit itself supported a violation of 
constitutional rights.”18  A plaintiff can show the existence of a policy when a 
decisionmaker with final authority “issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”19  
Custom may be established by showing that a “course of conduct, although not 
specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually 
 
16 Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he existence of disputed, 
historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will give 
rise to a jury issue”).   
17 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.  
18 Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).   
19 Id.  
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to constitute law.”20  A plaintiff must also “demonstrate that, through its deliberate 
conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”21   
 Appellants first contend that the evidence shows a pattern of inappropriate conduct 
regarding the use of pepper spray by BPD officers.  Appellants argue that even after 
receiving six complaints of improper use of pepper spray, the City made no changes to its 
procedures, amounting to deliberate indifference. 
 Evidence that a municipality “knew about and acquiesced in a custom tolerating 
the tacit use of excessive force by its police officers” could be sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment on Monell liability.22  However, Appellants have failed to connect the 
past complaints to the present action.23  Officer Ponik has no prior complaints of 
excessive force against him.  Likewise, the record shows that he has only utilized pepper 
spray one other time in his eighteen-year career.  And the prior complaints Appellants 
point to involved different circumstances than the one at hand, as some complainants 
admitted to resisting arrest and striking officers before pepper spray was deployed.   
 
20 Id. 
21 Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original). 
22 Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 976 (3d Cir. 1996).   
23 Id. at 973-76 (concluding that appellant “presented sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could have inferred that [the municipality] knew about and acquiesced in 
a custom tolerating the tacit use of excessive force by its police officers” where appellant 
demonstrated that the issue was more than “mere isolated events or mere statistics of the 
number of complaints.”  Appellant offered in evidence “a series of actual written civilian 
complaints of similar nature . . . containing specific information pertaining to the use of 
excessive force and verbal abuse by [the same officer].”  Appellant also showed that the 
municipality received an increasing number of excessive force complaints in the years 
surrounding the incident at issue, ranging from 34-77 complaints per year, and the officer 
involved in the incident had five complaints against him). 
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 Appellants also contend that even without a pattern of conduct, the need for officer 
training on pepper spray is so obvious that the failure to train amounts to deliberate 
indifference.  To make out a claim under a failure to train or supervise theory, the 
plaintiff must show that “the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of 
persons with whom those employees will come into contact.”24   
The record shows that Officer Ponik, and all BPD officers, attended the police 
academy before becoming officers.  There, they were trained on the use of force under 
the New Jersey Attorney General guidelines.  Officer Ponik also testified that he was 
trained in the use of pepper spray at the academy.  Additionally, the BPD conducts 
mandatory bi-annual training that includes instruction on use of force and pepper spray.  
The BPD also has an extensive internal procedure on the use of pepper spray, which 
Officer Ponik testified he was familiar with.  Based on the record, we cannot say that the 
City or Chief Scianni acted with deliberate indifference by failing to further train their 
officers on the use of pepper spray.  Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment as to Appellants’ Monell claims.  
C.  
Finally, Appellants assert that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Ponik 
caused Peter and Maureen Williams to be unlawfully detained.  We disagree.  
 
24 Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222-25 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that 
deliberate indifference can be demonstrated by showing a “pattern of violations” which 
“puts municipal decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary,” or a single 
incident where the risk of injury was a “highly predictable consequence” of the failure to 
train (internal citation omitted)).  
10 
 
Appellants assert claims for “False Arrest/False Imprisonment” under § 1983 and 
state law.25  A claim based on false arrest requires an arrest made without probable 
cause.26  “[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a 
claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”27  
While the Supreme Court has suggested that a claim for false imprisonment can be 
sustained without a false arrest in the event of a prolonged detention, it held that a 
detention of three days “does not and could not amount to such a deprivation.”28 
Here, the parties rely on video surveillance of the vestibule on the day of the 
incident, although they present different accounts of what happened on the video.  
Appellants assert that Officer Ponik blocked the only exit from the vestibule for a few 
seconds after deploying pepper spray.  Appellees respond that Officer Ponik was not 
blocking the door, and even if he was, no one was trying to escape in the seconds 
following the pepper spray deployment.  We have reviewed the video surveillance and 
note that it is of poor quality, grainy, and choppy.  It is difficult to ascertain with any 
degree of certainty whether Officer Ponik did in fact block the door after deploying 
pepper spray, or whether anyone tried to escape during that time.   
Nevertheless, it is clear that Appellants were not arrested in connection with this 
incident.  Therefore, Appellants’ federal and state law claims for false arrest must fail.  
As to false imprisonment, even accepting Appellants’ version of events, Appellants have 
 
25 App. 55.   
26 Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).   
27 Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).  
28 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).  
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presented no authority to support their claim that such a temporary detention amounts to 
false imprisonment.29  Accordingly, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims also fail.   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, as to Appellants’ claim of excessive force and related 
state law and loss of consortium claims, summary judgment will be vacated and the 
matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to the Monell claim and the 
false arrest/false imprisonment claims.   
 
29 See id. 
